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Someone has  said that  biology can  be exhaust ively subsumed  
under  three headings :  evolution, morphogenesis ,  and  thought.  
Evolution and  morphogenes is  have  already been discussed and 
so it is a p leasure  to turn  to the subject  of thought.  W h a t  I 
propose to do is tell about  some findings, attitudes, and in- 
sights tha t  come out of work in our laboratory.  These are 
largely theoretical,  and  they largely deal  with models,  bu t  it 
seems to me  they have  considerable applicat ion to the relat ion 
of an  organism,  or more  exact ly  of  "a sensory-motor  decision- 
system," to its envi ronment .  
LIMITATIONS OF AMPLIFIER-INPUTS 
The first aspect  of such a sys tem which I wan t  to empha-  
size is tha t  inputs  into the sensory ne twork  involve ampl i f ica-  
t ion  and select ion.  For example ,  the visual  receptor  cells, the 
rods and  cones of the eye, are sensory amplifiers. I t  is now 
believed tha t  the rods probably operate  at the "one-quantum 
level." This m e a n s  tha t  a single q u a n t u m  of light coming into 
a rod can  be detected, producing an  amplification, which is of  
the order of 107 t imes ( in  electrical vol tage) ,  in the first nerve 
impulse  tha t  goes out into the ret inal  ne twork and then is 
t ransmi t ted  down the optic nerve.  I t  is interest ing to m a k e  a 
compar i son  be tween this amplifier and a little electric photo- 
mult ipl ier  pulse amplifier. The rods and cones are very small ,  
only some 50 microns  long and 1 to 3 microns  in diameter ,  
and this fac tor  of  10 r in amplif ication in such a small  sys tem 
is a very impressive per formance .  
But these amplifiers,  like all other sensory and electronic 
amplifiers, have  necessary  l imitat ions on wha t  they can  de- 
tect about  the external  world. The l imitat ions come f rom the 
fac t  tha t  they are macroscop ic ,  that  they have  a t ime  cons tan t ,  
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and that  they have some noise background so they are not 
absolutely reliable. I would also emphasize that they are se- 
lective, and that  they are unidirect ional  in  their operation. 
Input  into the photocathode or a phototransducer  molecule 
( rhodopsin)  is amplified in one direction down the system, 
and then produces an output  which comes out at the other 
end. This chain cannot  be reversed by putt ing in a light quan- 
tum at the output  end and expecting to get an amplified signal 
at the input. I suspect that  some of the aspects and limitations 
of perception which are important  to us may  depend on such 
limitations in these elementary amplifiers which mediate be- 
tween us and the environment.  
SENSORY-MOTOR DECISION-NETWORKS 
Secondly, I want  to emphasize some of the new results 
on the combination of input-amplifiers and output  amplifiers 
into sensory-motor decision-networks, and on learning net- 
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Fig. 1. A s enso ry -mo t o r  dec i s ion -ne twork  i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t he  e n v i r o n m e n t .  
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an organism detecting 
its external world. It is an at tempt to diagram some of the 
essential relations for an organism as we now know them. 
In  fact,  what  I have in mind is specifically an artificial or- 
ganism, or "automaton," which is capable of surviving in certain 
types of environments.  I am interested in the parallel between 
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such an  au tomaton  and  a small  e lementa ry  nervous  network 
which has  cer tain propert ies  such as learning processes.  
One should not  belittle the value of such d iag rammat ic  
representat ions.  The specification of models  of  this sort has  
played a great  role throughout  history in providing insights 
into the na tu re  of  m a n ,  f r o m  the Car tes ian au tomatons  to 
Wiener ' s  feedback models.  W h e n  one wants  to study the brain,  
for  example ,  a good model  can  be i l luminating,  not  because 
it is exact ly  like the bra in  but  because it suggests the kinds  
of questions to ask and the kinds of relat ions and  details to 
look for. Wiener 's  cybernetics,  or feedback model ,  to m y  mind  
is one of the two or three mos t  impor tan t  ideas of the twentieth 
century  in te rms of its implicat ions for  all sorts of fields. 
W h a t  we have  to have  now is a model  which includes not  only 
the essential  e lements  of these useful  models  of the past ,  but  
some impor tan t  new elements  as well. 
In  par t icular ,  this d i ag ram is intended to represent  a paral. 
lel-processing cybernetic system. All the mill ions of sensory 
input  cells are symbolized by three little circles on the lef t  
side of the d iagram which are on the boundary  between the 
o rgan ism and the external  world. From these sensory cells, 
in this schemat ic  model ,  there emerge  first-stage neurons  
(below lef t ) .  These m a y  be connected to second-stage and  third- 
stage neurons ,  and so on, and there m a y  be cross-connections 
as shown at the bot tom of the diagram.  There  m a y  be other 
features,  such as proprioceptive feedback loops, and there 
m a y  be some kind of growth of  new connect ions ( shown at  
the bo t tom)  as one goes to higher-order organizat ion of events. 
All these neuron  chains  lead eventual ly to motor  outputs  
( r ight  side of Fig. 1 ). In  fact ,  unless we do micro-electrode 
studies, essentially all we can  learn  about the in ternal  workings 
of such a decision sys tem is in te rms  of its motor  outputs.  
These motor  outputs  feed back into the env i ronment  and lead 
to various env i ronmenta l  consequences ( top of the d i ag ram)  
which m a y  or m a y  not  feed back into input  in such a way as 
to modi fy  this input. 
REAFFERENT STIMULATION 
The reason  for  emphas iz ing  this par t icular  paral lel-processing 
network model ,  in which the inputs  lead to motor  outputs,  
which lead back to inputs,  is because it is a good representa-  
tion of the impor tan t  p h e n o m e n o n  of "reafferent  stimulation." 
I think it was  yon Holtz who first suggested the term, but  
recent ly  the work of Richard  Held and his colleagues in the 
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Psychology Depar tment  of M.I.T. has shown the great im- 
portance of this process. What  reafferent stimulation means  
is a change of the input field as a result of the motor output 
of the organism or animal  itself. 
Held's work has shown that  reafferent stimulation is essen- 
tial to the organization or adaptation of the visual field. This 
had already been shown in a number  of small ways. For 
example, Ditchburn and Riggs and their coworkers showed 
fifteen years ago that  continual motion of the eyeballs is neces- 
sary for visual perception. They measured the motions by put- 
ting contact lenses on the eye, with a little mirror on the side 
of the lens to reflect a beam of light. They showed that 
when the subject thinks he is fixating most  steadily on a point 
source of light, its image is in fact  moving around over the 
fovea, which is a region about 1 ° across at the back of the 
eyeball. The movement  consists of a series of drifting motions 
on which is superimposed a tremor motion of about a minute 
of arc, combined with occasional jumps or "'flicks." 
These motions of the image over the retina can be canceled 
by an ingenious mirror  arrangement ,  so that  spots you are looking 
at move just as fast  as your eye moves. Or they can be canceled 
even more successfully by mount ing  the little spot of light, or 
a microscope lens and a target pattern, on the contact  lens 
itself, so that it all moves with the eye. The lens combination 
has no appreciable weight, so it does not significantly affect 
the motion of the eye, and it is not  uncomfortable physically. 
The remarkable thing is that  with such a "stabilized image," 
vision ceases. For example, if the fixed-pattern apparatus is 
put  on in the dark and if the light is turned on, the pat tern 
can be seen for a fraction of a second and then it fades out. 
Only when some motion of the image is allowed is it seen 
again. What  this implies is that  at this eyeball-level, motion 
is necessary for visual perception. Presumably the stabilized 
image fades out for physical-chemical reasons because the 
cells adapt, or come to a "steady state." 
FUNCTIONAL GEOMETRY 
I have used this principle myself  in an attempt to solve 
what  I think is a most  interesting and classical visual problem: 
how do we see straight lines? I do not think my  own solution 
is widely accepted in the field, but  nevertheless I think it 
has some important  properties which I would like to bring 
to your attention. 
The problem of how we see straight lines with a highly 
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variable cellular re t ina  is a difficult one by all pas t  methods  
of approach.  I think it is a lmost  impossible to unders tand  if 
we s imply think of a static image  of the outside world fal l ing 
onto the ret inal  array,  because  the ret inal  arrays are genetically 
different f r o m  one person  to the next.  But even if they were 
not, it would be quite surpr is ing if  dur ing childhood develop- 
ment ,  every cell c ame  to lie in exact ly  the same micro-relat ion 
to the other  cells, or if  any  micro-relat ion like this should 
be individually predictable  to a high enough accuracy.  I t  is 
wor th  r emember ing  tha t  the accuracy  of our  percept ion of 
straightness,  at least  in detecting the lateral  d isp lacement  of 
a line segment ,  is of  the order of  2 seconds of a r c - - m u c h  
smaller  than  the d iameter  of  a ret inal  cell. Certainly when  
we look at  the re t ina  through a microscope,  the cell positions 
look very irregular .  
I t  therefore seems difficult to believe that  a static m a p  on 
the re t ina  could be in terpreted by you and by m e  to indicate 
the same object  pa t te rn ,  such as straightness,  because  the 
image will fal l  on one set of cells in your  eye and a different 
set of cells, differently arranged,  in m y  eye. 
But if  we use reafferent  s t i m u l a t i o n - - t h a t  is, a dynamic 
m e c h a n i s m  in which we move  the images  back  and  for th  on 
the r e t i n a - - t h e  prob lem suddenly becomes m u c h  more  simple. 
For example ,  a way in which we can  tell whether  the top 
edge of a b lackboard  is s t raight  is to look at the left  side of  
the edge and then  to look at the r ight  side. I f  the image  of 
the left  side falls on a cer tain set of cells in your  eye, and 
if it continues to fal l  on the same set of cells as you move  
your  eye across to the r ight  side, then  the line is straight.  
For no S-curve or general  i r regular  curve can  cont inue to fal l  
on the same ar ray  of cells in your  eye as you move it. 
In  short, I am suggest ing tha t  the simplest  way  to organize 
the geometr ical  space of the external  world is by looking 
for  invariances under displacement. I call this the principle 
of "funct ional  geometry,"  m ean i ng  a dynamic  approach  to 
geometry r a the r  t han  a static approach  in te rms  of mapping .  
The operat ion of " invar iance under  d isplacement"  can  be used 
by any eye and  re t ina  to single out as unique such impor tan t  
geometrical  pa t t e rn  e lements  and  regulari t ies as s t ra ight  lines, 
paral lel  lines, and  equidis tant  lines, as well as things like 
un i fo rm circular  arcs (provided you can  rotate your  eyeball  
about  the optic axis, as indeed you can ) .  
I t  is interest ing to see tha t  this method  of ext rac t ing pa t t e rn  
regulari t ies is very s imilar  to the methods  used for  genera t ing 
ma themat i ca l ly  perfec t  surfaces,  such as spherical  and  p lane  
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surfaces,  in high-precision optical work. John  Strong, the de- 
signer of high-precision rul ing engines,  has  described in detail  
the methods  of grinding and lapping for  generat ing perfec t  
spheres,  per fec t  planes,  perfec t  helixes, perfect  equidis tant  
spacings of a ruled grating,  and  perfec t  gears with high-precision 
angular  spacings of the gear teeth. Basically, his methods  do not  
involve measuremen t s ,  bu t  s imply involve sliding and lapping 
one surface,  such as a spherical  surface,  over another  which just  
fits it. 
In  this kind of d isplacement- invar iance  method,  you do not  
use any rulers,  and you do not  have  any  centers! The spheres 
define their own centers  and radii  as they are polished, and 
the numer ica l  values are not  even measured .  I f  you try to 
specify the center,  it turns  out tha t  you damage  the approach  
to sphericity because  you are "over-determining" the system. 
I t  has  to determine itself. In  comment ing  on this el imination 
of m e a s u r e m e n t  and external  centers,  Strong says, "the meth-  
ods of highest  precision are all pr imit ive methods."  
Does it not  seem likely that  a biological system would 
need to use some pr imit ive general  high-precision me thod  of 
this sort? For the eye has  no x-axes and y-axes for Cartesian- 
coordinate determinat ion of the pa t te rns  of figures. I t  has  no 
method,  as f a r  as I know, for  de termining  the "shortest  dis- 
tance  between two points." 
In  fact ,  the e l iminat ion of these classical bases of measure-  
m e n t  and construct ion m e a n s  tha t  funct ional  geometry gives us 
a new axiomatic  basis for  geometry.  We suddenly realize tha t  
Eucl idean geometry is "str ing geometry;"  it is the kind of geo- 
me t ry  you get by drawing on the sand using a piece of string. 
This can be seen in the definitions : a s t raight  line is the "shortest  
distance between two p o i n t s " - - o f  the kind tha t  is represented by 
a stretched string. A circle is the "locus of points  equidistant  f r o m  
a given point"----using a length of str ing as a measure  of distance. 
Car tes ian geometry,  on the other hand,  is "box geometry."  
I t  is the geometry  of a European  house,  in which the walls 
are made  of bricks tha t  step up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 . • . units.  The 
floor is made  of tiles tha t  march out 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 . . .  units,  nor th  
and  east. ( I  suspect  tha t  the Greeks, with the bowed-out columns 
and arched floors of their  temples,  could never  have invented 
Cartes ian geometry . )  But  now we come to funct ional  geometry,  
which  differs f rom these static, locus-of-a-point, geometries,  
and which has  no axes, no centers,  or "origin," no measures  of 
distance, no guaran tee  tha t  some pr imordia l  axes are at  r ight  
angles to each  o t h e r - -  and  which gets along extremely well 
wi thout  aU this initial  appara tus .  
Incidentally,  this even throws a new light on the "parallel  
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postulate." In  func t iona l  geometry,  the paral lel  postulate  is 
immedia te ly  provable,  because  if two lines are invar ian t  un- 
der d isp lacement  along t h e m - - t h a t  is, if  paral le l ism is defined 
by that  kind of i n v a r i a n c e - - t h e n  if they do not  mee t  in one 
region, they will never  meet ,  because they are invariant .  There-  
fore two paral lel  l ines so defined will never  meet .  Wha t  I suspect  
is tha t  Euclid or his predecessors  had  a kind of intuitive biologi- 
cal sense of  this sort. Perhaps  Euclid felt  tha t  two paral lel  
l ines ought  never  to meet ,  and  since this cannot  be proved 
by any  method such as the "interior-angle" construct ion f r o m  
the other axioms,  he  felt  it had  to be added as an addit ional  
axiom. 
The kind of discr iminat ions tha t  c a n  be made  by funct ional  
geometry raises an  interest ing question. The distinction be- 
tween a "straight-line" d isp lacement  (x- and  y-axes of the 
eyebal l)  wi thout  rota t ion (about  the z-axis) ,  and a "slightly- 
curved line" d isp lacement  with a little bit of rotat ion (about  
the z-axis) does not  depend on funct ional  geometry,  since 
both pa t te rns  m a y  be equally invar ian t  under  the r ight  muscle-  
motions.  Rather ,  it depends on the accuracy  of the "analog 
sys tem" moni tor ing  musc le  movements ,  which  tells you how 
m u c h  the muscles  (of  the z-axis) are moving.  We thus have  a 
lower-accuracy analog sys tem for  detect ing some fea tures  of  
the pa t t e rn  and  a h igh-accuracy  invar ian t  a r ray  sys tem for  
detecting other  fea tures  of the pat tern .  This is like the boy 
polishing a spherical  mirror ,  who cannot  control the curvature  
very accurately  even though he gets a very accurate  spherical  
surface  in every case. We cannot  in fac t  tell the difference 
be tween a s t raight  line and  a slightly curved one unless we 
have  another  line nea rby  to compare  it to (which  converts  the 
judgmen t  f rom an analog judgmen t  to an invariance-]udg- 
m e n t ) .  The analog and  the invar iance  m e c h a n i s m s  are then  two 
m e c h a n i s m s  working on top of each  other. The activities of 
the muscles  of the eye ( ana log)  do not  in themselves  define a 
very accurate  axis sys tem for  the m o v e m e n t  of the eye, and 
when  you are in a darkened room the image  seems to drif t  
a round in quite an  arbi t rary  way. But when  you look a t  a 
circle or an  object  with geometr ical  regularit ies,  the object 
itself, by its invar iances ,  can  de termine  its own centers and  
axes  with h igh  precision. 
PROPERTIES OF INVARIANT-SEARCHING SYSTEMS 
I wan t  to emphas ize  now some propert ies  of this kind of 
system. I f  it should be used in perception,  it would have  
several  ra ther  fasc ina t ing  characterist ics.  For one thing,  the 
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perception of regularities by this method does not depend on 
the location of individual cells on the retina. All you ask is 
that  the array of inputs is the same before and after the 
displacement-motion. Also, the accuracy of the perception does 
not depend on whether the image is straight or d is tor ted--  
because if the image of the left upper edge of the blackboard 
falls on an S-curve on your  ret ina when you are looking at 
it over here, and then the right upper edge falls on the same 
S-curve when you look over there, then the line is straight! 
The question is simply invarianee, and not the shape of the 
image. 
And just as it does not depend on the shape of the image 
on the retina, so it does not depend on the shape of the image 
far ther  back in the brain, on the cortex. The nervous network 
carries back a kind of distorted retinal map to the cortex, but  
we know that  it is split apart  onto the right and left half  
of the visual cortex. But we see that  this split in space is 
irrelevant, as long as we have an invariance in the network 
under  the scanning motion. 
The result is that  with this kind of mechanism straightness 
is a property in the external field, not  in the internal field. It 
is a property in a public space, in spite of our private differ- 
ences in detailed anatomy. Held has therefore described func- 
tional geometry as a method which "transcends the differences 
in individual anatomy." This t ranscendence of ana tomy is 
obviously extremely important  if we are going to be able to 
have an ostensive public language. Only so can there be public 
reference, in which I can point to something, and have some 
assurance that you- -or  a young b a b y - - m a y  look in the same 
direction and may  see a regularity similar to mine, in spite 
of the fact  that  your  network and his network is different, 
each of our arrays of cells is different, and so on. Only by 
some such physical t ranscendence-method can we arrive at 
interpersonal regularities in an external public space, which 
can then be a basis for ostensive definition and for language. 
INTERACTION WITH THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
There are fur ther  interesting properties which appear when 
we consider how such a system interacting with its external 
world mus t  work. Referring to Fig. 1, it can be seen that  in 
this kind of relationship the external world completes the 
feedback loop. That  is to say, we have half  of the feedback 
loop inside the organism, while the other half  is outside the 
organism. The result is that  if we look at an  object whose 
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input-signals have  just  begun  to come in, we do not  see the 
object unless the eyeballs move,  unless our motor  sys tem is 
man ipu la t ing  the images  across the visual  field. In  this sense, 
we do not  see "an  object"; we only see a family  of invar iance-  
relat ionships which are de termined in par t  by self-motion. 
We migh t  say wi th  Mart in  Buber,  then, tha t  our  percept ion 
depends on our hav ing  an  "I-it" relat ionship to the object. 
Or to pu t  it another  way,  we can  organize the external  world 
only by manipulating it, only by put t ing  out our own amplified 
motor  outputs  in such a way as to alter wha t  is in the field. 
I t  would not  be wrong to say tha t  in this k ind of sys tem 
awareness  depends on action. There  is no such thing as abso- 
lutely passive observation.  
Another  impor tan t  aspect  of a paral lel-processing cyber- 
netic sys tem like this is tha t  it is an  ampl i fy ing system. I 
have  spoken of the amplif icat ion at the inputs,  bu t  we also 
have  a fu r ther  amplif icat ion occurr ing in the motor-operat ions 
of the outputs.  These amplif icat ions modify  the external  world; 
for  they are designed or p r o g r a m m e d  to do that ,  and it is 
necessary  to do tha t  for  the survival  of the organism.  Such 
an ampl i fy ing organism is a center  of change of the environ- 
ment ,  creat ing changes  which can  be amplified up  to the 
m a x i m u m  power  that  the organism can  control. 
One new conjectural  theorem for  such  complex sys tems is 
tha t  it is probably not  possible to predict  the behavior  of a 
given decision sys tem by another  decision sys tem of the same 
order of complexity.  The  reason  is tha t  the second decision 
system cannot  de termine  the initial state of the first decision 
system, and  cannot  know wha t  the detailed q u a n t u m  inputs  
are into this first system. This  is because,  in the first place,  
the inputs  m a y  be pr iva te :  they operate  at the one-quantum 
level, and one decision sys tem m a y  respond to one or a few 
quanta  tha t  signal, say, the presence  of a red light, while 
there is no reason  why  the other  decision system, in a differ- 
ent  region of space, necessari ly  sees these quan ta  at all. 
Similarly, the in terna l  s t ructure  of a decision-network is 
private,  for  it is very m u c h  more  complex than  the n u m b e r  
of sensory detector cells tha t  a s imilar  network has  to look 
at it with. Thus,  in the case of h u m a n  beings the n u m b e r  of 
input  cells is of the order of 10 s, while the total n u m b e r  
of neurons  in the h u m a n  decision system is of the order 
of 1011. And the total  n u m b e r  of synaptic  connect ions be- 
tween the neurons  in the bra in  is of the order of  1000 t imes 
more  n u m e r o u s - - s i n c e  the average cell is es t imated  to have  
on the order of 1000 synapt ic  b u t t o n s - - s o  tha t  you have  some 
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1014 specific or not-so-specific synaptic junctions in the net- 
work. The result is that  with my  10 s little neurons of the eye, 
even if every one of them were detecting a different neuron 
or synapse in your  brain, I could not even in principle detect 
the total initial state of your 1011 or 1014 neurons or synaptic 
connections at a given instant. Possibly there is no law in 
principle against the "mutual  determinabflity" of two complex 
decision-systems (a l though I think there is),  but  there is 
certainly a kind of practical "forbiddenness rule" that  one de- 
cision system cannot  know what  another decision system of 
the same size is thinking. Perhaps it may  be possible for us 
with our 10 8 input-elements to see what  a tiny ear thworm's  
network is doing, but not what  any network of comparable 
size is doing. 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DECISION-SYSTEMS 
There is no such difficulty in physics and chemistry ob- 
servations. The reason is that  the rules and laws of physics 
and chemistry are '2ow-information laws" in which we detect 
the motion of a few stars or atoms or indicator-needles. With 
our l0  s detectors, we can detect redundantly,  and with a good 
deal of invariance-checking, the motion of one billiard ball. 
And even when we come to the complex things in physics 
and chemistry, such as the observation of water boiling or of 
compounds of various sorts, these are still low-information 
subjects compared to biology. And they are very low-infor- 
mat ion subjects compared to the structure of a h u m a n  brain. 
So I think m a n y  of the things that have been said in the past 
about the epistemology of science are really based on what  
we can know about low-information physics and chemistry. 
The epistemology, and our ideas of what  can be operationally 
observed or predicted, are going to have to be modified when 
we jump f rom the small thousand-element or million-element 
systems of physics and chemistry over to the 1011 and 1014 
element-systems of the h u m a n  brain. This is such an enor- 
mous  jump and goes so far  beyond the number  of sensory 
elements available to study such systems that  it will require 
a new attitude toward what  we can know about each other. 
Of course there m ay  also be statistical regularities and pre- 
dictabilities in such decision-systems, and invariance-regulari- 
ties of the type I have described. But there may also be 
assassination behavior which occurs only in the distorted 
brain of one particular person, and which is almost unpre- 
dictable in the billion-element conditionalities of its success 
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or failure,  but  whose effects m a y  be amplified up to the total  
energy that  the h u m a n  race can  manipula te .  
I t  seems to m e  tha t  this amplif icat ion in man ipu la t ing  the 
env i ronment  leads us into a fu ture  which is b ranch ing  out 
f rom each decision-system in an essential ly unpredic table  way. 
As a result,  I am more  sympathe t ic  than  mos t  philosophers 
are to the recent  a t tack by Mfli6 Capek on wha t  he calls 
the "myth  of f rozen passage."  He  is a t tacking the tradi t ional  
Minkowski-type of four-dimensional  t ime-space d iagram,  in 
which trajectories of part icles in t ime are represented as being 
essentially completely predictable f rom the past .  All pasts  
and all fu tures  are thought  of as being s imul taneously  "present" 
together  in this frozen space of the d iagram,  which is per- 
haps  not  so different f rom the old idea tha t  they were  simul- 
taneously present  in "the mind  of God," who is thus able to 
know all fu ture  destiny in advance.  But  the present  thoughts  
suggest  a quite different formula t ion ,  one in which  fu ture  tra- 
jectories, with high ampli f icat ion-manipulat ions  of energy and 
mater ia ls ,  are b ranch ing  out f rom this present  t ime at any  
point  where  complex decision-systems are operating,  in ways  
which are essentially unpredictable  in detail  by any  other  
s imilar  decision-system. 
A decision-system is cont inual ly  modify ing  the env i ronment  
a round it. One arrives at  a k ind of existentialist  picture of the 
operat ions of a decision-system, for  which the only t ime is "now." 
As it uses its existing s t ructure  to operate  on and  ampl i fy  the 
exist ing and  incoming env i ronmenta l  influences, it reshapes  the 
world around it into a fu ture  of its own decision-determination.  
A fu r the r  curious point  is tha t  the t ime and space of such 
a sensory-motor  decision-system in their  manipula t ion-ru les  
come to be ra ther  different f rom the t ime and space of physics;  
in some sense they are not  Euclidean. 
We cannot  speak accurate ly  of a time, t, or an  ins tantaneous  
t ime for  a decision-system, because  it takes 30 mill iseconds 
or more  for  the nerve signal to go through me,  so tha t  m y  output  
a t  a "given" t is s u m m a t i n g  inputs  over a r ange  of t imes before,  
and  in fac t  i t  is uncer ta in  jus t  where  and when  we should say, 
"this is the output." The t ime is not  the t ime of a l ightning flash, 
as in physics,  but  is r a the r  a distr ibution of t imes-past ,  including 
all those tha t  are stored or reverbera t ing  in the s t ructure  so as to 
affect  the output.  This is true also of  space:  the inputs  are not  
inputs  f rom a point locus; r a the r  they are inputs  f rom whole 
figures, f r o m  the whole a r ray  of inputs.  And the outputs  are not  
outputs  at a point, but  are outputs  which  fill the room, as m y  
voice fills the room. 
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When is the ins tant  of t ime? Where  is the point  of action? 
There  is no point of action. W h a t  we are doing is operat ing 
on a kind of sensory input-totali ty and manipu la t ing  it into 
another  kind of totality at the outputs.  I am not  saying that  
this cannot  be reduced and analyzed in detail point  by point;  
and I a m  not  saying I do not believe in differential equations. 
Wha t  I a m  saying is that  the phi losophy of operat ion of this 
k ind of decision-system is not  the phi losophy of operat ion 
of the locus of Eucl idean points moving  on sharp  pa ths  through 
a three-dimensional  space cont inuum. 
The resul t  is tha t  this kind of decision-system operates  in 
two worlds, so to speak. The first is the world of external ,  or 
objective, science, of the physics of the env i ronment  around 
it. This is the world in which the decision-system "prepares  
a state," lets the external  objects run  on without  interact ion,  
and then  sees wha t  happens.  I t  is the externa l -envi ronment  
par t  of Fig. 1, in the upper  half ,  only weakly interact ing with 
the organism.  The world of physics is a world of weak inter- 
action. 
But the other world, the world of the bo t tom hal f  of the 
d iagram,  is not the world of physics but  the world of cybernetics.  
I t  is the world of goal-directed behavior,  of manipula t ive ,  pur-  
posive behavior  which  is trying its hardes t  to ampl i fy  and to 
in teract  strongly with the environment .  I t  is the world which is 
not  pr imar i ly  concerned with scientific and  detached observation 
and informat ion,  so to speak, except as these contr ibute to its 
personal  knowledge, values, purposes,  decisions, and acts. This 
very ins t rumenta l  at t i tude toward science is implied, of course, in 
our basic science textbooks, but  implied in an  oddly suppressed 
way so that  the students tend to forget  their  own h u m a n  opera- 
t ional r o l e - - t he i r  decision-system r o l e - - i n  creat ing and evalu- 
at ing science. 
T H E  THREE METHODS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING 
There  are three methods  of problem-solving which evolved in 
the course of evolution. The  first is the method  of problem-solving 
by survival. This is the "phylogenetic method"  in which all the 
moths  that  didn' t  m a t c h  the color of the bark  got picked off by 
birds, and wha t  is left  is a species which has  solved the problem 
of ma tch ing  the color of the bark.  
The  second method  is problem-solving by individual  learn- 
ing. This is the "ontogenetic method."  Whereas  species survival 
involves the selection of chromosomes  and  DNA, individual 
learning involves the selection or connect ion of learning neu- 
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rons in a learn ing  nervous system. In  this case the beast  does 
not  have  to fall  over the cliff before he is able to d raw back 
f rom it, because  he  can  see the edge of the cliff in t ime, or he 
realizes that  he has  been in a si tuation like this before,  so he pulls 
back. 
The  third method  is problem-solving by anticipation. This 
comes only with the development  of symbolic manipula t ion ,  
so that  by abs t rac t  analysis one knows the laws of na ture  
which can  be extrapolated into the future .  This is of course 
the me thod  of science. 
The  difference between these methods  is i l lustrated by the 
fJ_rst Sputnik tha t  was  sent up. I t  was  not  one of thousands  
of Sputniks  shot into space, of which all died except  one 
which happened  to go around. Nor  was it like the ra t  finding 
its way  through a learning maze ,  with the rocket  going first 
too high and then  too low unt i l  it finds out which  orbit is 
sat isfactory.  No, the rocket was p r o g r a m m e d  in advance,  with 
problem-solving by anticipation. An on-line feedback-control  
p r o g r a m  was set up, and  the laws of physics were used in 
the computers  and the feedbacks  to de termine  into which 
orbit it should go; and it went  in the r ight  orbit the very first time. 
The  impor tance  of these considerat ions is tha t  more  and 
more  of our problems are problems tha t  we have  never  me t  
before;  and  they are problems tha t  will have  to be solved 
by ant icipat ion by s c i ence - - i f  they are to be solved at all 
before they kill us. 
This ant ic ipatory manipu la t ion  of the env i ronment  by com- 
plex decision-system intelligence is something tha t  has  come 
late in the history of p lane ta ry  evolution. F rom a broader  
point  of view, Lederberg has  described three great  stages of 
evolution, s tar t ing with the preorganic  molecules.  He calls t hem 
stages of "chemogeny,"  or build-up of complex molecules in the 
sun 's  radiation-field; "biogeny," af ter  self-catalysis begins, with 
na tu ra l  selection; and  "cognogeny." Wha t  I have  been describing 
here  is the development  of systems m ak i ng  a collective transi t ion 
over to the cognogenic stage of evolution, in which we are doing 
abstract ion of na tu ra l  laws and  symbolic manipu la t ion  with 
enormous  power  control over the envi ronment .  Eventually,  of 
course, cognogeny will include the extensive development  of 
artificial sensory-motor  decision-systems, or au tomata .  
I t  is philosophically interest ing to inquire whether  there 
m a y  be some kind of convergent  evo lu t i on - - in  different solar 
systems,  for  e x a m p l e - - t o  the cognogenic stage. One sees the 
convergence of wings in reptiles, birds, and bats  to s t ructures  
built  in different ways but  having  s imilar  longitudinal  struts;  
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surfaces  tha t  have  a "camber ,"  a s imilar  length-to-chord ra t io  
for  an imals  of a given weight  floating in our par t icular  den- 
sity of air, and so on. There  is a convergence to certain inherent  
or p rede te rmined  regulari t ies of wing fo rmat ion  which are 
necessary for  aerodynamic  success. 
One can  say the same things about  the convergence of eye- 
forms,  which have  been invented independent ly  seventeen 
times in evolution, according to one list. Again they converge 
to a small  n u m b e r  of forms,  with all of them in the higher  
organisms,  I believe, having some close-packed directional- 
mosaic  of cells like a retina. We suppose tha t  this happens  
because this is probably the best  way, if  not  the only way, 
to see s imul taneous  external  relat ions in m a n y  d i rec t ions - -  
by using a close-packed parallel-processing input  array. The  
physics of the situation, the env i ronmenta l  necessities, chan-  
nel wha t  is successful  into certain directions. 
Religious people have  interpreted this regular i ty  of efficient 
fo rm as an "a rgument  f rom design." And I think a scientist 
could even agree tha t  the wing of an  an imal  of a cer ta in  
size is "predestined," at least  in a metaphor ica l  or phsyical- 
necessity sense, not  to look like a club. I t  is predest ined to 
have cer tain aerodynamic  parameters .  
I a m  emphasiz ing  this because I wan t  to go on to ask the 
question, Is intelligence, and the emergence  of the cogno- 
genic stage, also a case of evolution toward a "predestined" 
set of  pa r ame te r s  in the same fashion?  Tha t  is to say, once 
complex decision-system organisms have  passed a cer tain 
threshold in manipu la t ing  the e n v i r o n m e n t - - w h i c h  might  be a 
threshold of the use of tools or speech or fire---isn't  it a lmost  
"necessary," in this same  sense, tha t  they go on to develop 
a man ipu la t ing  environment-organiz ing symbol-using bra in  of  
the type we have?  Could one talk about  the possibility of 
convergent  evolution in this sense toward intelligence? I think 
this is not  an  absurd or meaningless  question, but  one which 
could be solved by theory and  experiment .  And I think it is 
a question which biologists have  an  obligation not  to deny or 
erase, because  it is a question that  inevitably comes up in 
discussing evolution, in discussing the m ean ing  of the appear-  
ance of m a n  and of intelligence with  citizens and religious people 
and philosophers.  
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND 
THE COLLECTIVE FUTURE 
We are on the threshold of a very peculiar  future,  unlike 
anything tha t  has  ever happened  in the world before. I t  is 
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one in which  we organ isms  are all in teract ing like mad ,  in 
reshap ing  all of  our  envi ronment .  In  the last  few years  we 
have  stepped up  by m a n y  orders of magni tude :  in t e rms  of 
communica t i on  speed, by a factor  of  107 over  wha t  it was  100 
years  ago; in te rms  of t ravel  speed, by a fac tor  of 10 ~ over  
100 years  ago; in weapons,  by a fac tor  of  106 over  even 30 
years  ago, and  so on. We have  stepped into a new world of 
resources,  of  power,  and  of h u m a n  interact ion,  within which  
evolution will take place on entirely different principles,  with 
entirely different pa r ame te r s  of pressure  and  change f r o m  
wha t  has  ever been  before. As Lederberg has  said, "There 
will be more  evolution in the next  50 years  t han  in the last  
100,000." 
This  is the end of the era  of evolution by na tu ra l  selection. 
I t  is the beginning  of evolution by h u m a n  selection. Every 
species on the globe is going to be increasingly per turbed 
in its number s  by  our  predat ion,  our  pollution, our breeding,  
or our  protection. The number s  will not  be de termined by  
wha t  we used to call "na tura l  selection" so m u c h  as by con- 
scious or unconscious  h u m a n  intervent ion which  is now shaping 
wha t  the s t ructure  of the biosphere is going to be. In  such an  
unpredictable  large-scale crisis, we will be able to survive only by 
mak ing  m a x i m u m  use of all we know about  ant ic ipatory problem- 
solving, with ant ic ipatory control and ant ic ipatory feedbacks.  
The danger  is clear; only in this way can  we keep f rom destroying 
our biosphere and  ourselves, by collective accident. I f  we do 
survive, these feedbacks,  of course, will necessari ly lead to higher  
degrees of cooperat ion and lower degrees of conflict in the world. 
Our increasing interaction-intensi ty will necessari ly lead to a 
new kind of mutua l i ty  in our decisions, a mutua l i ty  in which we 
can  no longer t reat  each  other  as objects, but  m u s t  t rea t  each 
other as co-part icipants  and co-subjects in all our  exper iments  
and plans.  Wha t  this all means  is that  in the t imes just  ahead,  ff 
we survive, we are going to move  toward something  m u c h  
more  like an aggregate dec i s ion-sys tem--more  like a single 
o r g a n i s m - - t h e n  we have  ever been  before. 
Perhaps  it was  implicit  in the biological mate r ia l  and the 
physical  necessities all a l o n g - - a s  surely as the eventual  de- 
ve lopment  of wings is implicit  in an  a tmosphere .  
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